Embracing Failure in Afghanistan

By Lt Col Eric W. Hommel (USAF, retired)

Published 11/01/24

When was the last time a leader publicly held themselves accountable for failure? Maybe it was President Jimmy Carter who, in 1981, addressed the American people and took full responsibility for the failed Iranian-hostage rescue operation that resulted in the deaths of eight American service members. Carter said, “It was my decision” and “the responsibility is fully my own.”

In my memoir, The Losing Game: How to Lose a War and Fail Veterans (Amazon - THE LOSING GAME), I attempt to take ownership of, and explore America’s failed mission in Afghanistan, where misguided leadership snatched defeat from the jaws of victory. I ask, “Why can’t military and civilian leaders explain or take responsibility for failing?” I explain the mission and uncover the realities of modern warfare where the truth of what it takes to secure the peace is often ignored. I illustrate a method of prosecuting modern wars through a lens of respect, empathy, humility, and accountability; and introduce the reader to an innovative method of taking care of our veterans scarred with PTSD by giving them a “do over” using newly discovered Immersive Prolonged Exposure therapy. I expose how we’ve continued to fall short in prosecuting war, securing the peace, caring for veterans and the realities of modern warfare where the truth of what it takes to win is often ignored. And finally, I take responsibility for failure.

To be clear, The Losing Game is not about pointing fingers at a select few leaders dissecting their actions by employing an empirically evidenced academic analysis or peer-review study. The intent of this memoir is to expose the reader to the military construct from the ground up and try to explain recent wars from a senior leadership perspective. As such, I illustrate my unusual and unique journey … beginning with enlisted submarine service during the Cold War, to deployment in Iraq, then as a ground battle-space commander and commander of the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan’s Panjshir province, with time in-between spent as a military legislative liaison to Congress, and eventually as someone who benefited from these wars. Along this journey I hope to highlight the lessons I learned, observed, implemented, ignored, and missed by providing an honest look into my unconventional expedition. In the process, I introduce and analyze a perspective hardly understood by those who claim to understand.

As a stability operations practitioner, the on-the-ground perspective I offer allows the reader to understand that we can do better; we must do better. To do better, we must change the way we conduct our business. It’s not just about shifting the way we conduct war—we must shift the way we conduct reconciliation, transition, and peace.

I will never claim to have all the answers, and anyone who makes that assertion is certainly suspect. What I do have is the truth of experience and the reason, perspective, and understanding born of that experience. From the truth of experience, I hope to give the reader a glimpse into how the military works, how we’ve conducted twenty-first-century warfare, and how senior leadership lies about winning. I argue that we are bound to repeat our failures if we continue to lie about winning and continue to be unwitting players in the losing game.